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Abstract
In this paper we build a model to analyze distributional conﬂict when the utility of each
agent is heterogeneously inﬂuenced by other agents’ utility. There are two dimensions of het-
erogeneity: who inﬂuences whom, and the strength of any such pairwise dependent inﬂuence.
The pattern of bilateral inﬂuences takes the form of a weighted and directed network. Direct
inﬂuences spread their eﬀects through chains of connected agents in this network. We charac-
terize the Nash bargaining solution and analyze how pairwise inﬂuences, and the indirect eﬀects
they generate, are internalized in shares and utilities obtained. The analysis relies on network
centrality indexes that measure each agent’s prominence due to his position in the inﬂuences
structure. Our results have implications for the study of urban crime, government spending,
and bargaining with social preferences.
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11 Introduction
Inﬂuence in outcomes and behavior across individuals is pervasive in many social and economic
settings. This inﬂuence can take many forms. It can be centralized, and result from a common
inﬂuence of the environment. Else, it can be decentralized and supported by more local interactions.
At its most disagreggated level, inﬂuence is mediated by pairwise interactions. The collection of
such pairwise interactions can display a rich pattern that might overall inﬂuence the resulting
individual outcomes.
Cross inﬂuences can be an important issue if we deal with distributional conﬂict. Consider
a ﬁxed resource to be divided among a set of individuals. Any possible division of this resource
has a direct eﬀect on individual outcomes. In addition to this direct eﬀect, there can also be an
indirect eﬀect mediated by the possible interactions that might arise across some pairs of individuals.
Through the chains of interactions present inside the group, these indirect eﬀects can spread all over
the population. When individuals agree collectively on the division of this common resource, all
these inﬂuence eﬀects have to be internalized adequately. The pattern of direct pairwise inﬂuences
can thus play a crucial role in the solution of the distributional conﬂict.
When considering disaggregated pairwise inﬂuences, there are two diﬀerent possible sources of
heterogeneity in its underlying structure: the geometry of interactions, that expresses who inﬂuences
whom, and the magnitude of each one of these inﬂuences. The aim of this paper is to analyze how
the whole structure of such pairwise inﬂuences aﬀects the bargaining outcomes.
Consider for example the case of urban crime. Crime patterns on city’s neighbourhoods are
interlaced and there are several reasons why this is so.
First, the division of cities into diﬀerent neighbourhoods is merely an administrative issue.
Criminals do not doubt in crossing the street and move from a neighbourhood to another to
commit their activities. Hence, if no natural barrier imposes diﬃculties to this movement, this
is a natural source of interdependence in crime rates across neighbourhoods. This is very much
related with the so called Modiﬁable Area Unit Problem (M.A.U.P.) highlighted in the literature of
spatial statistics in geographic information science. Diﬀerent groupings into neighbourhoods lead
to variability in statistical results. When aggregating for crime rates it is unlikely that there exists
a univocal relation between neighbourhood characteristics and crime outcomes.
Furthermore, the embeddedness of individuals into social networks that might spread over the
city, impacts also criminal behavior. Some individuals might imitate the behavior of their contacts
in their network of acquaintances (see Glaeser et al., 1996). Some others might infer (maybe
erroneously) information on the beneﬁt on commiting crime (see Sah, 1993). Hence, criminal
behavior suﬀers a contagion eﬀect inlaid to the social environment. This social osmosis process also
induces spatial inﬂuence in crime rates.
When the major has to decide on how to distribute resources to ﬁght urban crime, and when a
representative of each neighborhood asks for part of these resources, we come up with a distribu-
2tional conﬂict with inﬂuences on crime rates across pairs of neighborhoods. Our analysis sheds light
on how the particular neighborhood geography and the pattern of inﬂuences across neighbourhoods
are internalized in the ﬁnal resource allocation.
The environment. There are two dimensions of heterogeneity in the model. On the one hand,
the particular geometry of bilateral inﬂuences. Not everybody necessarily exerts an inﬂuence on
every other agent. The pattern of direct bilateral inﬂuences determines who exerts an externality
on whom and how inﬂuences spread indirectly through the economy. On the other hand, the mag-
nitude of each bilateral inﬂuence is pairwise dependent. The magnitude of an inﬂuence relation
depends on exactly which agent exerts this inﬂuence and which agent receives it.
Direct inﬂuences generate indirect network eﬀects. We call network externalities the sum of all
these indirect eﬀects. These are direct externalities derived from the allocation of resources, and
measure how the level of consumption, not the utility, of an agent aﬀects another agent’s utility.
Each pattern of pairwise inﬂuences determines a unique pattern of network externalities.
To better understand the spread of inﬂuences through direct bilateral inﬂuences we reinterpret
at some points in the paper the model in terms of networks. The network links an agent to another
whenever the second agent exerts a direct externality on the ﬁrst one. Externalities spread then
through the links of the network. We can keep track of all indirect inﬂuences generated from
bilateral inﬂuences through paths and cycles in the associated network. The network metaphor is
adequate in this setting due to asymmetric pairwise bilateral inﬂuences. Connections with well-
known notions from social network analysis, such as centrality measures, arise as natural tools for
the network reinterpretation of the model.
Direct bilateral inﬂuences within a ﬁnite set of agents are modeled with the use of a linear
model that encompasses the possibility of positive and negative inﬂuences as well as asymmetric
inﬂuences within pairs of agents. The model is characterized by a matrix that collects the possibly
diﬀerent levels of bilateral inﬂuences for each possible pair of agents, the primitives of the model.
A unit of a divisible resource has to be distributed among the agents of the economy. The
utility that an agent obtains comes from the share of the resource that receives and also from the
utility of agents that exert an inﬂuence on him, which enters his utility function proportionally to
the intensity of the direct inﬂuence each of these other agents exert on him.
In the example on crime, whenever direct inﬂuences exist among crime rates in diﬀerent neigh-
bourhooods, the allocation of a part of the resources against urban crime does not only have a
direct eﬀect on this neighbourhood. Its eﬀects also spill over the rest of neighbourhoods in an
heterogeneous manner. Hence, when the diﬀerent neighbourhoods are engaged in dispute for these
resources, and they understand that these spillover eﬀects exist, they show heterogeneous prefer-
ences on possible assignments. Even if probably each neighbourhood would prefer to receive all
the resource, if they realize they have to achieve an agreement with the rest of neighbourhoods,
3they would prefer that those neighbourhoods that overall exert a larger spillover eﬀect on it receive
more resources than those that exert less.
A linear structure of inﬂuence is assumed for tractability. It ensures for, almost, every economy
with inﬂuences the existence of a unique solution to the system relating utilities. This solution
provides the utility in terms of the allocation, instead of in terms of others’ utilities. Hence, solving
the model means characterizing the eﬀect the share of the resource an agent receives changes others’
welfare, and it internalizes the indirect eﬀects bilateral inﬂuences generate.
Still another assumption has to be argued. We suppose constant returns to the share of the
resource received. This is an strong assumption. Probably the returns to direct investment on
ﬁghting against crime in a neighborhood are not constant. However, assuming constant returns,
inﬂuences become the unique underlying force that yield to diﬀerences in the results. In general,
the introduction of concavities due to other reasons not related to inﬂuences would distort the
analysis of the eﬀect of inﬂuences on the bargaining outcome.
When distributional conﬂict exists, the bargaining outcome is given by the Nash bargaining so-
lution. With its use we ensure a unique well-deﬁned outcome after the resolution of the conﬂict. Of
course, this choice comes at a cost. By using a cooperative solution we abstract from institutional
or environmental restrictions that can play a role during the bargaining process. These institu-
tional restrictions are generally introduced deﬁning a particular non-cooperative bargaining game
that takes them into account. Then each particular application should be followed by a diﬀerent
non-cooperative game that speciﬁes its particularities. This way we would lose some of the general
conclusions that a more stylized model can give as general features of somewhat diﬀerent situations.
Results. We restrict our analysis to the more interesting case of regular economies. Regular
economies are such that any allocation that exhausts resources is Pareto eﬃcient. In regular
economies, the Pareto frontier is non-degenerate.
For such economies, we characterize completely the Nash bargaining solution, providing closed-
form expressions for the utilities and shares obtained.
The reason for which we restrict to regular economies is the following. In non regular economies
the Pareto frontier is degenerate. This is so because the inﬂuence exerted by some given agent on
others is much bigger than the inﬂuence he receives in return. Eﬃciency might require then that
this agent receives all the resources available. If an individual in a group is so much loved by
anybody else compared with other possible aﬀective relations, which means that the inﬂuence this
agent has on others’ utility is very large, it could be eﬃcient to give him all the resource.
Similarly, there might exists intermediate situations in which only some agents are allowed to
receive a share of the resource for eﬃciency reasons. While our methods and analysis could be
extended to such nonregular situations, we focus on the analysis of regular economies in which the
pattern of inﬂuences excludes de facto some agents from the course for some part of the resources.
4We ﬁrst characterize regular economies. This characterization is twofold. First, regular economies
are characterized by an upper bound on the aggregate level of bilateral inﬂuences every agent ex-
erts on others. In terms of direct bilateral inﬂuences, we obtain a bound on the maximal level
of aggregate direct inﬂuences an agent can exert. The economy is regular if and only if no agent
exceeds this bound. Second, regular economies are characterized by conditions on the pattern of
network externalities. More precisely, an economy is regular if and only if all agents are equally
central in the network structure of inﬂuences. The relevant measure of network centrality is the
Katz-Bonacich centrality index, pervasively used in the sociology literature, and that also arises
naturally in other economic settings.
We next provide a constructive procedure to characterize the Nash bargaining solution. It is
important to note that even if the economy is regular and, hence, the distributional conﬂict involves
all agents in the economy, this does not exclude the possibility that some agents obtain ﬁnally no
share of the resource. Externalities do not directly solve the bargaining problem but this does not
mean that they can not be suﬃciently asymmetric such that, after internalizing all inﬂuences, the
Nash bargaining solution assigns nothing to some of the agents.
A geometric procedure is presented to check if the solution for a particular economy is interior,
meaning all agents obtain a positive fraction of the resource, and to characterize the solution in
this case.
We also devote part of our work to the analysis of α-economies. In these economies all existent
pairwise inﬂuences have intensity equal to α, and whenever an agent exerts an inﬂuence on another,
this other agent also exerts an inﬂuence on the ﬁrst one. One of the two dimensions of heterogeneity
in the model, the possibly diﬀerent levels of externality intensities across individuals, is kept to a
minimum. The main source of heterogeneity is the geometry of the pattern of pairwise inﬂuences.
An analysis in depth of this family of economies gives a better picture of how the particular
arrangement of pairwise relations, irrespective of the intensities of these, impacts on bargaining
outcomes. In particular, utility is directly related with the number of connections an agent has.
Those agents that receive and exert more inﬂuences are also rewarded with larger utility levels.
However, this monotonicity does not necessarily translates into receiving larger fractions of the
resource.
Finally, we also study how changes on the pattern of inﬂuences distort the Nash bargaining
outcome. We analyze how changes in the levels of bilateral inﬂuences change the bargaining result.
Furthermore, we also discuss how our framework can be used to describe and analyze situations in
which some agents that are not involved in the bargaining game can aﬀect the bargaining outcome.
Applications. Besides the example on urban crime, our model is ﬂexible enough to encompass
other possible applications.
Consider for example government spending. When deciding how to divide the public budget
5within government departments a possible concern for the ministers is to take into account that
outcomes related to responsibilities of one department can aﬀect outcomes related to other de-
partments. The result of the bargaining process should then depend on these inﬂuences generated
across departments.
The department of social aﬀairs might exert a positive externality on the department of educa-
tion. If more resources are spent on social aﬀairs, such as ameliorating life conditions in specially
poor regions, this can translate into larger school attendance rates in this regions and hence an
improvement in aggregate level of education of the country, a subject under the domain of the
education department. Moreover, this eﬀect on citizens’ education can translate into an increase
on the understanding of good and healthy habits that might imply an increase on life expectancy
in the country, a fundamental issue for the health department.
Observe that the outcome improvement on health comes indirectly from an increase of resources
for social aﬀairs. This increase on resources improves the outcome for social aﬀairs which through
a direct inﬂuence improves the outcome on education, which improves the outcome on health. This
is another example of indirect inﬂuences that spread due to network eﬀects. In this setup our
analysis sheds some light on how the pattern of inﬂuences across diﬀerent departments maps into
government bargaining agreements.
Another possible application is in the ﬁeld of social preferences.1 Following the line of seminal
work from Gary Becker (1974), altruism and envy can be interpreted as inﬂuences of a very partic-
ular kind, with its source coming from psychological reasons. An agent is altruist for another if he
is better oﬀ when the other is better oﬀ. Hence, this second agent is exerting a positive inﬂuence
on the ﬁrst one. Inversely, an agent is envious for another agent if he is worst oﬀ when the other is
better oﬀ, and in this case the inﬂuence the second agent exerts on the ﬁrst is negative. Our work
applies then to the analysis of a bargaining game in the presence of pure altruism and envy eﬀects,
where the pattern of altruism and envy is variable in intensity across pairs of agents.
Related Literature. Our model bears a formal resemblance with previous work on interde-
pendent utilities by Bergstrom (1999) and Bramoull´ e (2001). Bramoull´ e also interprets this type
of systems in terms of weighted and directed networks, but focuses on some qualitative features of
the mapping from bilateral inﬂuences to network externalities.2 Here instead, we analyze the map-
ping from bilateral inﬂuences to Nash bargaining utilities and agreed shares, providing closed-form
expressions for both.
1See Fehr and Schmidt (2002) and Sobel (2005) for very comprehensive surveys of the theoretical literature and
the empirical evidence on social preferences. Levine uses a linear model similar to the one we develop in our work
to analyze experimental results for some classes of games. Roth (1995) is a survey of experimental evidence of social
preferences in bargaining games.
2For a complementary approach to this mapping and a general characterization of Pareto eﬃciency in such a
setup, see de Mart´ ı (2006).
6A strategic model on status in networks that generates similar interdependency systems is
provided in Rogers (2005). Rogers analyzes a network formation game in which agents with het-
erogeneous skills can choose with whom they want to contact and with which intensities they want
that this contact is made. Hence, the pattern of inﬂuences is endogenously chosen. We analyze
instead situations in which the structure of pairwise inﬂuences can not easily be aﬀected by in-
dividual strategic decisions. For example, in the urban crime example no neighbourhood can do
much to delimit inﬂuences among them, since these are largely determined by private decisions
and actions of the population, which is an issue out of their control. A similar comment applies
on the example on interdepartmental inﬂuences in a government. Also, altruism and envy are not
only the result of strategic decisions but the eﬀect of the embeddedness of individuals on a social
environment they can not necessarily determine and control.
The model also resembles input-output models of linear economies (Leontief, 1951, Gale, 1960).
However, input-output models only allow for positive bilateral inﬂuences, while here we do not
impose sign restrictions of any sort. Of course, we also deal with very diﬀerent issues.
Some papers have analyzed multilateral bargaining with externalities from a non-cooperative
viewpoint. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a, 1995b) consider a setup where one seller bargains with n
potential buyers to decide which of them obtains the unit of an indivisible good. The acquisition of
the good by one of the agents can exert a positive or negative externality on others. They analyze
how the bargaining outcome is aﬀected by this allocative externality.
In a political economy context, Calvert and Dietz (2004) explore how the introduction of ex-
ternalities in a 3-agent economy alters the conclusions of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) non-
cooperative game of legislative bargaining. See Duggan (2004) for conditions about existence of
equilibria in the n agents version of the Baron and Ferejohn game with externalities.
While our cooperative approach is less sensitive to possible particularities in the bargaining
process, such as the particular mechanisms by which buyers and sellers bargain or the existence of
a voting rule (the majority rule in Baron-Ferejohn models) in legislative bargaining, it allows for a
general and tractable analysis of multilateral bargaining with one unique outcome prediction and
an heterogeneous pattern of externalities.
Our work also borrows from the very active literature on networks in economics. However, we do
not deal with the formation of social and economic networks, maybe the more extensively studied
issue in the ﬁeld, but on games played in a ﬁxed network.3 Other authors have also explored
the interrelation of network structure and bargaining outcomes (see Calv´ o-Armengol, 2001, and
Corominas-Bosch, 2004 ). The approach in these papers is diﬀerent in many respects. Just to
mention a few, bargaining is not among the many and the network represents communication
restrictions and delimits the possible pairs of agents that can trade.
3See Jackson (2005) for a very extensive survey of the ﬁeld of networks in economics, and for an exhaustive list of
references about games played in networks, including bargaining games.
7The Katz-Bonacich centrality measure was ﬁrst deﬁned by Katz (1953) and later on developed
by Bonacich (1987). It is one of the more relevant centrality measures studied in the active ﬁeld
of social network analysis.4 Another game played in a network, in this case not a bargaining
game, where this centrality measure naturally arises is Ballester et al. (2006). Agents play a game
with pairwise dependent strategic complementarities. In the unique equilibrium of the game each
agent action is proportional to his Katz-Bonacich centrality index measured on this network of
complementarities.
2 Bilateral Inﬂuences and Network Externalities
2.1 Modelling Bilateral Inﬂuences
In this section we propose a simple framework that allows to model positive and negative allocative
inﬂuences across individuals.
Suppose that there is an amount of a certain resource to be distributed within a group of n
individuals, N = {1,...,n}. Let ci be the consumption of agent i ∈ N. Let bij ∈ R be the
magnitude of the inﬂuence agent j exerts on agent i. Then, an increase of one unit of welfare for
agent j induces an increase of bij units of welfare for agent i. Given a proﬁle c = (c1,...,cn), the
utility an agent obtains , ui (c), is equal to
ui (c) = ci +
 
j =i
bijuj (c) i = 1,...,n (1)
This set of equations forms what we call the bilateral inﬂuences system. Note that the relation in
this system is from outcomes to outcome.
In terms of the urban crime example, bij represents how the crime rate , not the share of public
budget received, in neighborhood j aﬀects the crime rate in neighborhood i.
Due to linearity, we can ﬁx the sum of consumption levels to
 n
i=1 ci to be equal to 1. Hence,
we can interpret ci as the share of the resource received by agent i.
Deﬁning bii = 0 for all i ∈ N, we gather all the bij in a matrix B of bilateral inﬂuences. An
economy is completely characterized by its matrix of bilateral inﬂuences.
For a given economy B, we can obtain from the structural system of bilateral inﬂuences to a
reduced-form system where the utility of each agent can be directly expressed in terms of the shares
proﬁle, eliminating the dependency on other’s utility.
The bilateral inﬂuence system in matrix form is equal to
u(c) = c + B   u(c) (2)
Hence, if I is the identity matrix, whenever (I − B)
−1 exists we obtain the reduced-form system
u(c) = (I − B)
−1   c (3)
4For an exhaustive survey of this literature see Wasserman and Faust(1994).
8The ﬁrst result we provide is a genericity result. An economy is characterized by n(n − 1) real
values. Therefore, there is a one-to-one mapping from economies to elements of Rn(n−1). From this
point of view, the set of economies in Rn(n−1) for which (I − B)
−1 does not exist has (Lebesgue)
measure zero. This implies that for almost every economy B, the associated matrix (I − B)
−1
exists (and, of course, is unique) and the next result then follows.
Proposition 1 For almost every economy B the associated reduced-form system is uniquely char-
acterized.
In words, given a structural system of bilateral inﬂuences there is no indeterminacy in the
obtention of the associated reduced-form expression, except for a negligible set of economies.5
Let E(B) = (I − B)
−1. Each entry eij (B) expresses the magnitude of how the utility increases,
if the entry is positive, or decrease, if the entry is negative, when the level of consumption of agent
j increases. We call E the matrix of network externalities. An explanation for the choice of this
name follows.
2.2 From Bilateral Inﬂuences to Network Externalities
Any economy B can be naturally represented by a network.
A network is formed by a set of nodes and a set of links that express a relation between the
pair of nodes linked. While this is an abstract object, it is a useful metaphor to represent many
varied situations in applied settings. In particular, in our case this metaphor can be applied to
make nodes represent the agents involved in the structural system of bilateral inﬂuences, and make
links represent the pattern of bilateral inﬂuences exerted across pairs of agents. A link in such an
inﬂuence network is weighted, each link has an associated value that represents the strength of the
inﬂuence this link represents, as well as a particular direction, since the inﬂuence agent i exerts on
j does not necessarily coincides in strength with the inﬂuence agent j exerts on agent i, and hence
we have to distinguish the link from i to j and the link from j to i.
Diﬀerent conventions could be adopted to express the mapping from economies to networks.
We adopt the following one. We say that there is a link from agent i to agent j whenever j exerts
a, positive or negative, inﬂuence on i, and the weight for this link is then equal to the coeﬃcient
bij ∈ R of the structural system of bilateral inﬂuences. Since in our model there is no self-inﬂuence
we do not allow for self-loops, links from an agent to itself. The set links that begin in i point to
the agents that inﬂuence agent i.
Observe the weighted and directed nature of the network deﬁned in this way: since we have not
imposed any restriction on the possible values of the coeﬃcients in the structural inﬂuence system,
the weight of a link can take any real value; also, since we have not imposed symmetry on the levels
5See Bramoull´ e(2001) for structural models of a similar nature for which indeterminacy in the determination of
the associated reduced-form system arises.
9of bilateral inﬂuence, it is possible that there exist both a link from i to j and another one from j
to i and that their respective weights diﬀer. Even more, it is possible that there exist a link from
i to j while there is no link from j to i.
A weighted and directed network is deﬁned by an adjacency matrix, where the entry (i,j) in
this matrix is equal to the weight of the link from i to j. This weight equals the level of bilateral
inﬂuence j exerts on i. Hence, given an economy B the adjacency matrix of its associated network,
in the way we have deﬁned this network, is also B.
The following equality applies
E(B) = (I − B)
−1 (4)
Whenever B is a contraction6 we have that
(I − B)
−1 =
+∞  
k=0
Bk (5)
If j exerts an inﬂuence on i with weight bij and k exerts an inﬂuence on j with weight bjk, k exerts
an indirect inﬂuence on i with weight equal to bijbjk. The matrix B2 keeps track of these second
order network inﬂuences. The entry b
[2]
ik of B2 computes the sum of weights of all paths of length
two from i to k.7
More generally, for any l ≥ 1 the matrix Bl keeps track of the l-order network inﬂuences: each
entry b
[l]
ik equals the sum of weights of all paths of length l from i to k.
Therefore, whenever the expression in equation (1) is valid, the entry eij (B) of E(B) is the
sum of weights of all paths from j to i in the network represented by the economy/adjacency
matrix B. The matrix E(B) computes the sum of indirect (network) eﬀects that the pattern of
bilateral inﬂuences generates. This sum of indirect eﬀects of any order is what we denote network
externalities, and this is why we call matrix E(B) the matrix of network externalities.
Each entry eij (B) represents by how much the consumption of agent j aﬀects the utility of
agent i not only through the direct bilateral inﬂuence agent j exerts on i, represented by bij, but
also through the indirect inﬂuences resulting of all possible indirect network connections from j to
i.
The following example, borrowed from Bramoull´ e (2001), is useful to understand how important
are indirect network eﬀects for the analysis of the mapping from allocations to utilities deﬁned in
the reduced-form system.
6The matrix B is a contraction if and only if all its eigenvalues have norm smaller than 1. This will be the case
for example for the set of regular economies, that we deﬁne later, if bilateral inﬂuences are positive.
7A path between i and j in network G is a sequence of agents i1,...,iK of N, where an agent can appear several
times in this sequence, such that ikik+1 is a link of G for every k ∈ 1,...,K − 1, with i1 = i and iK = j. The
length of such a path is equal to K − 1, the number of links that form the path. In words, a path in g is an indirect
connection from agent i to agent j through linked agents in B. We deﬁne the weight of a path i1,...,iK of G as the
product gi1i2 ···giK−1iK. This weight is diﬀerent than zero because of the deﬁnition of path. A path such that i = j
is called a cycle.
10Example 1. There are three agents, N = {1,2,3}, and the structural system of bilateral in-
ﬂuences relating them is
u1 (c) = c1 + b12u2 (c) + b13u3 (c)
u2 (c) = c2 + b23u3 (c)
u3 (c) = c3
where b12 and b13 are positive but b23 is negative. This means that both agent 2 and 3 exert
a positive direct inﬂuence on agent 1, probably with diﬀerent intensities, while agent 3 exerts a
negative inﬂuence on agent 2. Besides, the values for these direct bilateral inﬂuences are b21, b13
and b23.
The network that represents this situation is
t
2
t
3
t
1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
J
J
J
J
J ^ -
b12 b13
b23
Figure 1
and the 3 × 3 bilateral inﬂuences matrix is
B =



0 b12 b13
0 0 b23
0 0 0



Hence, the 3 × 3 matrix of network externalities, E(B) = (I − B)
−1, is equal to
E(B) =



1 b12 b13 + b12b23
0 1 b23
0 0 1



Observe that in this case we can easily compute the matrices of indirect network eﬀects, Gk for
k ≥ 2. The matrices of higher order network eﬀects are
B2 =



0 0 b12b23
0 0 0
0 0 0



Bk =



0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0


 for every k ≥ 3
11Therefore, E(B) = I+B+B2. The expressions of utilities in terms of consumption are therefore
U1 (c) = c1 + b12c2 + (b13 + b12b23)c3
U2 (c) = c2 + b23c3
U3 (c) = c3
The weight of the network externality agent 3 exerts on agent 1, e13 = b13 + b12b23, depends
on the intensities of bilateral inﬂuences. In particular, if −b12b23 > b13 the externality is negative,
even if the direct bilateral inﬂuence b13 is positive. A tension arises because even if agent 3 exerts
a direct positive inﬂuence on agent 1, the negative inﬂuence agent 3 exerts on agent 2 also has an
indirect (network) eﬀect on agent 1 due to the indirect path from 3 to 1 through agent 2. This
negative inﬂuence is internalized in the reduced-form system related to network externalities and
makes it possible that e13 is negative if the bilateral negative inﬂuence 3 exerts on 2 is large enough.
We omit the dependence of E on B when no confusion is possible.
3 The Set of Pareto Allocations
3.1 Characterization
From now on we will consider that there is a certain amount of a resource that, without loss of
generality, we normalize to one. Before turning to the study of distributional conﬂict and how agents
in an economy agree to divide this unit of resource among them, we have to make a clariﬁcation
about the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations in an economy with inﬂuences. Externalities can have
severe consequences on which allocations can be Pareto eﬃcient. Our aim in this section is to
characterize the set of economies for which distributional conﬂict is particularly strong.
Before providing an example of the peculiar situations that can arise in economies with inﬂuences
we describe the utility possibility set for any economy B, that we denote UPS(B). Given an
economy B, and for any feasible allocation, we have that u(c) = E   c =
 n
i=1 cie(i), where e(i) is
the i-th column vector of the matrix of network externalities. Since an allocation c is feasible if and
only if ci ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N and
 n
i=1 ci ≤ 1, we can conclude that the utility possibility set for
the economy deﬁned by B is the convex hull of the columns of the matrix of network externalities
E plus the zero vector, that is
UPS(B) = co
 
e(1),...,e(n),0
 
This implies that the utility possibility set for any economy B is a simplex, and therefore it is a
convex and compact set.
12Example 2. Consider the economy represented by the following network
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The 2 × 2 matrix of bilateral inﬂuences is
B =
 
0 3/2
1/2 0
 
It follows that the matrix of network externalities for this economy is equal to
E(B) =
 
4 6
2 4
 
Here e(1) =
 
4
2
 
and e(2) =
 
6
4
 
and the utility possibility set for this economy is the convex
hull of these two vectors and the zero vector. We can depict UPS(B)
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It turns out that the unique eﬃcient allocation in this economy is (u∗
1,u∗
2), that corresponds to
(c∗
1,c∗
2) = (0,1).8 At the unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation agent 2 receives all the resource. This is
so because the magnitude of the externality agent 2 exerts on agent 1 is much larger than the one
of the externality agent 1 exerts on agent 2. The eﬀect of an increase in the level of consumption
of agent 2 is then larger in agent’s 1 utility than the eﬀect of an increase in his own level of
consumption.
8Recall that we have normalized the total amount of resources to one. This is, of course, without lose of generality
because of linearity.
13When considering such kind of situations the implications on the solution to the Nash bargaining
problem is immediate. Since the Nash bargaining solution has to be Pareto eﬃcient and there is a
unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation, the Nash bargaining problem is trivially solved.
We will disregard the kind of economies that we have just described. Indeed, we will concentrate
from now on in the completely opposite kind of situations. We will only consider economies where
any allocation that exhausts available resources is Pareto eﬃcient. When this happens we say
that the economy is regular.9 The assumption of a regular economy ensures there is a nontrivial
bargaining problem and there exists competition among all agents to obtain some share of the unit
of resources.
The next result provides a complete characterization of regular economies in terms of the matrix
of network externalities. Before stating it we deﬁne a useful notion for the analysis in the rest of
the paper.
Deﬁnition We say that an n-dimensional vector µ is a strict system of weights if and only if
 i > 0 for every i ∈ N and
 n
i=1  i = 1.
Now we provide the ﬁrst characterization result of regular economies.
Proposition 2 An economy B is regular if and only if there exists a unique strict system of weights
µ and a positive constant κ > 0 such that µ   e(i) (B) = κ for every i ∈ N.
The previous result characterizes regularity through the matrix of network externalities. Each
element of column e(i) expresses how large is the network externality agent i exerts on each agent.
When we compute the weighted average of these elements we obtain a single value that expresses
an overall measure of network externalities exerted by agent i. Hence, Proposition 2 says that
regularity amounts to ﬁnd normalized weights, which are unique and depend on the economy we
are analyzing, such that this overall measure of network externalities each agent exerts is positive
and equal for all agents.
It is also possible to provide a characterization of regular economies in terms of the primitives
of the economy, i.e. the matrix B of bilateral inﬂuences.
Proposition 3 A necessary and suﬃcient condition for an economy B to be regular is that
n  
j=1,j =i
bji < 1 for every i ∈ N
9Observe that this is not the unique other possible situation. It could be that only a subset of agents should
consume for an allocation to be Pareto eﬃcient. For a generic characterization of all possible situations in terms of
endogenous centrality measures derived from the position of each agent in the network of bilateral inﬂuences, see de
Mart´ ı Beltran (2006).
14This result provides a simple and direct way to check if an economy is regular, and it helps us
to understand better which are the network forces that induce regularity. It states that regularity
amounts to requiring that the aggregate level of bilateral inﬂuences each agent exerts on others,
 n
j=1,j =i bji, is not too large, in fact not larger than 1.
For example, consider an economy where all agents are connected to each other and the level
of bilateral inﬂuence across any pair of individuals is equal to certain value α. In this case the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for such kind of economy to be regular is that α < 1
n−1. this
condition is satisﬁed if α < 0, and only if bilateral inﬂuences are positive the condition bounds
α. This is quite natural. When inﬂuences exerted are negative, distributional conﬂict naturally
arises because each agent wants the rest of the economy to receive the smallest possible share.
Any allocation that exhausts resources is in this case Pareto eﬃcient. Instead, when inﬂuences are
positive and suﬃciently large each agent would prefer that other agents receive all the resource
since this would increase more his utility than receiving himself part of it, and the Pareto frontier
might degenerate to a single point.
Consider a regular economy B. Then we can compute easily its associated strict system of
weights µ and constant κ from Proposition 2.10
Lemma 1 Let B be a regular economy. Deﬁne δi = 1 −
 n
j=1,j =i bji, i ∈ N, and δ =
 n
i=1 δi.
Then, κ = 1
δ and  i = κδi for all i ∈ N.
The value of δi is negatively related to the level of aggregate bilateral inﬂuences agent i exerts.
Hence,  i is smaller the larger this aggregate level of bilateral inﬂuences is. The next section studies
more in detail how these constants relate to the particular network structure of inﬂuences, and we
provide interpretations for them.
3.2 Eﬃciency and Network Centrality
We can provide an alternative interpretation to the eﬃciency characterization in proposition 2. To
this end, we have to introduce some terminology derived from the literature on social networks.
Given a network we can try to measure the prominence of each agent due to her position
in the network. There are several variables that can determine the prominence of an actor in a
network. Furthermore, the deﬁnition of prominence may depend on the setting we are studying.
It is not the same if we deal with directed or undirected networks, or with weighted or unweighted
networks. Hence, there is not in the social network analysis literature a unique standard deﬁnition
of prominence.
The more usual concept to analyze prominence in networks is centrality. It is fairly natural
to associate prominence with connectivity and this is what centrality measures do. In the case of
weighted and directed networks, as the ones we are considering in our analysis, a rough measure
10The proof of Lemma 1 is contained in the proof of Proposition 3.
15of centrality of agent i would be the sum of weights of the links that point to agent i, Si =
 
j =i bji.11This measure is called the degree centrality of agent i. In terms of our structural inﬂuence
model, Si measures the aggregate level of inﬂuence that emanates from agent i.
Note that δi = 1 − Si, which is a positive quantity whenever the economy B is regular, is
then a complementary degree centrality index for agent i. Its value is smaller the largest is the
degree centrality measure Si. Therefore,  i is also a complementary centrality index, since it is a
renormalization of δi to make the sum of the indices for all agents to add up to one.
While this degree centrality is informative of some kind of prominence derived by the way
inﬂuences vary across pairs, it does not capture the value of how these inﬂuences spread indirectly
along chains of bilateral inﬂuences.
Remember that, as we have explained before, given an economy B we have that for any l ≥ 1
the matrix Bl keeps track of the l-order network externalities: each entry b
[l]
ij equals the sum of
weights of all paths of length l from i to j. Hence, to construct a more elaborate centrality measure
we might include these indirect network eﬀects subsumed in the sequence of matrices
 
Bl 
l≥1. A
natural way is to consider a decay factor λ ∈ (0,1] and weight the l-order network eﬀects by λl.
This is the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. The (unweighted) Katz-Bonacich inner-centrality12
measure vector, b(G;λ) is deﬁned as:
κ(B;λ) =
 
∞  
l=0
λlBl
 t
  1
Whenever this vector is well-deﬁned we can rewrite it as:
κ(B;λ) =
 
(I − λB)
−1
 t
  1
A variation of this measure, called the weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality measure, is the following.
Let µ be an strict system of weights. Then the µ-weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality measure,
κµ(B;λ), is given by the following formula:
κµ(B;λ) =
 
(I − λB)
−1
 t
   
In the unweighted Katz-Bonacich centrality measure all agents count the same when considering the
sum of network eﬀects generated by each one of them. In the µ-weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality
measure the network eﬀects generated by agent i are counted with weight  i. Some agents count
more than others when aggregating the whole matrix of network eﬀects E(B).
11This is an inner-centrality measure. Alternatively, we could deﬁne an outer-centrality measure by the sum of
weights of the links that start in agent i. Since, as we will show in a moment, in our analysis the relevant centrality
measure is an inner measure, we avoid this possible distinction in the text.
12It is an inner measure of centrality because it measures weights of paths and cycles that end on each agent. An
outer-centrality measure could be deﬁned without transposing in the following equation.
16After this digression into the realm of social and economic networks, we can reinterpret the con-
dition of proposition 3 making use of weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality measures. The condition
is equivalent to say that there exists a unique strict system of weights   such that
 
(I − B)
−1
 t
  µ = κ1
with κ being a positive constant. The reader can immediately recognize the µ-weighted Katz-
Bonacich centrality measure, with λ = 1, in the left handside of the last equation. Hence the
regularity condition says that there exists a vector of weights for which the weighted Katz-Bonacich
centrality measure is equal, and positive, for all agents. This individual index measures the aggre-
gate level of network inﬂuence eﬀects that i generates. These are represented by the paths on the
network that ﬁnish on i, and this is exactly what the Katz-Bonacich centrality index takes into
account.
Two comments are in order. First, observe that our model generates endogenously the unique
system of weights µ for which this centrality condition is satisﬁed. This is Proposition 3. Second,
the decay factor is equal to 1, and hence direct and indirect inﬂuences count the same to compute
this measure of prominence. Hence, we can rewrite proposition 2 as follows
Proposition 2’ The economy B is regular if and only if there exists a unique strict system of
weights µ and a constant κ > 0 such that
κi
µ(G;1) = κ for all i ∈ N
A general characterization, not only for regular economies, of Pareto eﬃciency in economies with
pairwise inﬂuences by means of centrality measures can be found in de Mart´ ı (2006).
4 Bargaining and Inﬂuences
4.1 The Bargaining Problem and its Solution
From now on, we consider only regular economies with inﬂuences. We turn to the study of distri-
butional conﬂict for these economies.
We consider the classical and widely used Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950). Following
this seminal work we deﬁne an n-person bargaining problem as a duple  X,d , where X ⊂ Rn is a
convex and compact set that expresses the utility possibility set in the economy, and d ∈ X is the
disagreement point, that expresses the utilities each agent would obtain in case they are not able
to reach an agreement. The disagreement point has to satisfy the following dominance condition:
there exists v ∈ X such that v strictly Pareto dominates d, i.e. vi > di for every i ∈ N. The
17(symmetric)13 Nash bargaining solution xS =
 
xS
1,...,xS
n
 
to  X,d  is the solution to the following
maximization problem
max
x∈X
n  
i=1
(xi − di)
Due to convexity of the utility possibility set X and strict convexity of the objective function this
problem has a unique solution.
We want to analyze this Nash bargaining solution in the case the utility possibility set X is
induced from a regular economy with inﬂuences. Observe this is possible since as we mentioned
before UPS(B) is convex and compact for any economy B.
Given an economy B, let umin =
 
umin
1 ,...,umin
n
 
be the utility vector where each entry umin
i is
equal to the minimal utility agent i can obtain within the set of eﬃcient allocations of economy B.14
Since we assume that the economy is regular, from Proposition 2 we know that there exist only one
strict system of weights µ and one positive constant κ such that µ e(i) = κ for every i ∈ N. Given a
disagreement point d we relabel agents from 1 to n such that  1
 
umin − d1
 
≥     ≥  n
 
umin
n − dn
 
.
Finally, let
ψ(0) =
1
n
(κ − µ   d)
and let
ψ(j) =
1
n − j
 
κ − µ   d −
j  
k=1
 l
 
umin
k − dk
 
 
for any j ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
Now we have all the necessary ingredients to characterize the Nash bargaining solution for any
regular economy with inﬂuences. This is done in the following result.
Proposition 4 Consider a regular economy B. Then, there exists j ∈ {0,...,n − 1} such that the
utility vector associated with the Nash bargaining solution, uS, is
uS
i = umin
i if i ≤ j
and
uS
i = di + ψ(j) 1
 i
if i > j
The Nash bargaining solution allocation is equal to cS = (I − B)uS.
This result characterizes the utilities and levels of consumption of the Nash bargaining solu-
tion for any regular economy. In particular, it characterizes corner, partially corner and interior
solutions.
13To simplify the analysis we only consider the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. The analysis for asymmetric
Nash bargaining solutions with heterogeneous bargaining power is completely analogous.
14In fact, u
min
i = min{ei1 (B),...,ein (B)}, so this vector of minimal utilities can easily be derived from the group
inﬂuence matrix.
18For an individual i that obtains positive gains, uS
i −di > 0, these gains are inversely proportional
to  i. If both i and j obtain positive gains we have that
uS
i − di
uS
j − dj
=
1 −
 
k =j bkj
1 −
 
k =i bki
(6)
The relative gains of agent i with respect to those of agent j uniquely depend on the level of
aggregate inﬂuence exerted by agent i and agent j. In particular, the largest is the magnitude of
aggregate inﬂuence that emanates from agent i compared with those that emanate from agent j,
the largest the relative gains of i with respect to j.
Aggregate inﬂuence levels determine relative gains for those agents that obtain positive gains.
This does not mean that these levels form the unique relevant information from the structural
inﬂuence model to characterize the Nash bargaining solution. The minimal utilities proﬁle, umin,
and therefore the multiplier ψ(j), can not be expressed in terms of the aggregate inﬂuence levels.
Indeed, minimal utilities internalize all levels of network inﬂuence eﬀects, since umin
i equals the
minimal entry in i’s row of matrix E(B). In non-interior solutions where some agents obtain no
gains from bargaining the information from the matrix of network externalities is fundamental for
the characterization of the Nash bargaining outcome.
The multiplier ψ(j) represents the remaining surplus, the remaining value of the available unit
of resources in terms of utilities, once we substract the minimal utilities some of the agents obtain
(agents k ≤ j). The rest of this remaining value is shared proportionally to the inverse of entries
of µ.
Example 3. The analysis of the following two economies illustrate the characterization we have
just provided in a 2-agents setting. Economy (a) is such that b12 = 4/5 and b21 = 1/4 while
economy (b) is such that b12 = b21 = 1/2. The matrices of network externalities for each economy
are
E(a) =
 
5/4 1
5/16 5/4
 
E(b) =
 
4/3 2/3
2/3 4/3
 
The utility possibility set with the respective Nash bargaining solution depicted, when the disagree-
19ment point is d = 0, in both cases are
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In example (a) we obtain a corner solution. One agent receives all the resource as the solution
to the distributional conﬂict. We have that δ1 = 3/4, δ2 = 1/5, and therefore δ = 19/20. The
associated constant and strict system of weights from Proposition 2 are κ = 20/19 and  1 = 15/19,
 2 = 4/19. The minimal utility each agent can obtain in a Pareto eﬃcient allocation is umin
1 = 1
and umin
2 = 5/16. In this case the j from proposition 4 equals 1, and the multiplier is ψ(1) = 5/19.
In the solution, agent 1 receives nothing and agent 2 receives all the resource. Agent 1 obtains his
minimal utility, us
1 = 1, while agent 2, instead, obtains uS
2 = ψ(1) 1
µ2 = 5
19
19
4 = 5
4, that equals his
maximal possible utility within the set of eﬃcient allocation.
In example (b) we obtain an interior solution. Both agents obtain a utility within their minimal
and maximal utility. In this case, we have that δ1 = δ2 = 1/2,and therefore δ = 1. The associated
constant and strict system of weights from proposition 2 are therefore κ = 1 and  1 = 1/2,  2 = 1/2.
The minimal utility each agent can obtain in an eﬃcient situation is umin
1 = umin
2 = 2/3. We get
that the j from proposition 4 equals 0 and the multiplier is ψ(0) = 1. Hence, each agent obtains a
utility equal to us1 = us
2 = ψ(0) 1
µi = 2.
4.2 Discussion
4.2.1 A Geometric Characterization
We can provide a graphical approach of how the Nash bargaining solution is obtained in the case
of an interior solution. A similar kind of interpretation can be given for corner and semi-corner
solutions but then the analysis is more involved.
In proposition 4 we have obtained a complete characterization of the Nash bargaining solution,
both in terms of utilities and shares received. In particular a fundamental ingredient for this
20characterization is the unique strict system of weights   from proposition 2. Call µ−1 the vector
with entries the inverses of the entries of µ, i.e.  −1
i = 1/ i. If the Nash bargaining solution
is interior, the vector of utilities agents obtain is equal to the disagreement point plus a positive
multiple of vector  −1. From this construction we can derive a geometric procedure to deduce
when the Nash bargaining solution is interior given a particular economy B. We present it with
the use of the two previous examples.
We depict again the utility possibility sets and the vectors   and  −1 for each example.15
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In a regular economy the vector µ is orthogonal to the Pareto frontier in the utility possibility
set.16 We have depicted the vector µ−1 in the point (0,0) because this is the disagreement point.
In the ﬁrst example, since the vector µ−1 lies outside the utility possibility set, no multiple can
intercept the Pareto frontier. Therefore, the solution can not be interior.
In the second example, the vector µ−1 lies inside the interior of the utility possibility set and
then the Nash bargaining solution can be obtained by multiplying the vector by a positive scalar
until it touches a point of the Pareto frontier. This point is the Nash solution utility vector.
Just to clarify that this geometric procedure is valid for any possible disagreement point, and
not only for the case in which d = 0, we show here how it applies also for the ﬁrst economy in the
15We have rescaled both vectors for convenience. This does not aﬀect at all the reasoning.
16The conditions on Proposition 2 determine a hyperplane with orthogonal vector µ. The utility possibility set is
a subset of this hyperplane.
21case that d = umin.
6
-
0 u1
u2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
C
C
C
C
C
C
CC
5
4 1
5
4
5
16
￿
￿
￿￿ ￿
µ−1
s
s
us
umin
Figure 6
We situate the vector µ−1, that does not change with the change of disagreement point since it
only depends on the matrix B, in the point umin = (1,5/16). The point where a positive rescaling
of µ−1 touches the Pareto frontier coincides with the Nash bargaining solution utilities proﬁle, us.
4.2.2 The Disagreement Point
As stressed in Binmore et al. (1996), the choice of a particular disagreement point entails also some
of the features of the bargaining process when considering the Nash bargaining solution. In our
case two diﬀerent possible disagreement points emerge as the more natural choices.
The ﬁrst one is the choice of d = 0. This would be the natural choice when in the bargaining
situation there are time concerns. In this case, agents now that an agreement could be inﬁnitely
delayed and therefore obtain no utility at all. This time concerns are modelled by means of the
choice of the zero vector as the disagreement point.
Another possibility is to choose d = umin, that is that di coincides with the minimal utility agent
i can obtain in an eﬃcient situation, umin
i . In a regular economy, this vector of minimal utilities
satisﬁes the property of domination that the disagreement point has to satisfy. Observe that this
disagreement point derives endogenously from the pattern of inﬂuences expressed by matrix B. It
might be a natural selection when considering situations in which no time concerns exist. When
Pareto eﬃciency is a requirement of the solution to the distributional conﬂict, as it is in the case
of the Nash bargaining solution, agent i might make recognize the rest of members in the economy
that he should not obtain less than umin
i .
Hence, while our cooperative approach can not capture all of the features of particular appli-
cations, some of these features can be incorporated into the model, not by changing utilities but
directly through the choice of the disagreement point.
22Corollary 1 The Nash bargaining solution is always interior when d = umin. The Nash bargaining
solution is interior when d = 0 if and only if for all i ∈ N
 
j =i
bij
δi
δj
< 1 (7)
This condition resembles the condition for regularity stated in Proposition 3. However, it is
diﬀerent in two aspects. First, the set of pairwise inﬂuences that appear are in this case the ones
that i receives, instead of those that i exerts. Second, these bilateral inﬂuences are weighted by the
quotient
δi
δj
=
1 −
 
k =i bki
1 −
 
k =i bkj
For example, in the case that all bilateral inﬂuences are positive this quotient is larger than 1 if
 
k =i bkj >
 
k =i bki. The inﬂuence j exerts on i is weighted by larger values in condition (7) if j
exerts a larger aggregate level of direct inﬂuences on others than i. Observe that this quotient was
also present when computing relative proﬁts obtained from bargaining across pairs of individuals.
When we ﬁx a disagreement point d such that for some agent umin
i > di we also impose a
value to the minimal gains that this agent is going to obtain from the bargaining situation. This
value is equal to umin
i − di. It might be possible that these minimal gains from bargaining can not
be reconciled with the conditions imposed on relative gains across individuals in (6) when agents
obtain a positive share of the resource. The conditions in Corollary 1 exactly account for this fact,
and provide the expressions that ensure that this tension does not arises.
To better understand that interiority condition when d = 0, we analyze in more depth the case
of two agent economies. Given an economy
B =
 
0 b12
b21 0
 
the values of δ1 and δ2 are δ1 = 1 − b21 and δ2 = 1 − b21. Given the regularity condition, this
two values are positive. The conditions for interiority expressed in the previous corollary are in
this case,
1 − b12
1 − b21
> b12
1 − b21
1 − b12
> b21
The following reasoning helps understand when we lose interiority. Fix a value b21 < 1. If
b12 = b21 the conditions reduce to 1 > b12 and 1 > b21 which are trivially satisﬁed because of
regularity. When we increase b12 the second condition is still satisﬁed since the left-hand side
increases. But the left-hand side of the ﬁrst condition increases while the right hand side of this
23same condition increases. If we increase b12 enough it is possible that this ﬁrst condition is not
satisﬁed for the parameters. It becomes too diﬃcult to control for both conditions. Agent 2 exerts
a larger inﬂuence on agent 1 than the inﬂuence agent 1 exerts on agent 2. If this diﬀerence is
suﬃciently asymmetric, and this asymmetry is measured by the two conditions above, then one of
the agents receives all the resource, even if the economy is regular.
4.3 Nonparticipants and the Bargaining Outcome
Until now, we have considered that all agents in the economy are involved in the bargaining prob-
lem. However, our model also provides a framework to study what would happen if some agents
in the economy do not participate in the bargaining problem but care for some of the agents that
indeed participate.
The following example shows in a simple economy how we can use the tools we have developed
so far to clarify the eﬀect of agents that do not participate in the bargaining problem. It is very
close to the example developed in Kalai (1977).
Example 4. Consider the economy with three agents represented by the following network
s s s - ￿ - ￿
1 2 3
1/2
1/2
α
α
Figure 7
where α is a positive constant. Suppose only agents 1 and 2 are engaged in a bargaining problem.
How does the introduction of agent 3 into the model17 perturbs the bargaining outcome respect to
the situation when we consider agent 1 and 2 in isolation? The solution to the bargaining problem
without the presence of agent 3 is cS = (1/2,1/2), as we have previously described. If we take care
of the existence of agent 3 we could proceed as follows.
The matrix of bilateral inﬂuences is
B =



0 1/2 0
1/2 0 α
0 α 0



Hence, the matrix of network externalities when considering the 3 agents is
E(B) =
4
3 − 4α2



1 − α2 1/2 α/2
1/2 1 α
α/2 α 3/4



17In the social preferences interpretation we can interpret agent 3 as a relative of agent 2.
24Each entry eij of this matrix represents the network externality magnitude agent j exerts on agent
i if we consider the pattern of bilateral inﬂuences within all agents in the economy, included agent
3. Now, we could solve for the bargaining problem as we did previously in this section considering
the submatrix E1,2 obtained eliminating from E(B) the third row and column
E1,2 (B) =
4
3 − 4α2
 
1 − α2 1/2
1/2 1
 
to characterize the Nash bargaining solution for the bargaining problem that involves only agent 1
and 2, but taking care of the initial levels of interdependence of the three agents in the economy.
In particular the allocation that solves this problem is
cS =
 
1
2
 
1 − 4α2
1 − 2α2,
1
2
 
1 − α2
1 − 2α2
 
Observe the change in the pattern of consumption. If α is positive and suﬃciently small then
cS
1 < 1/2 and cS
2 > 1/2. Bilateral inﬂuences agents 2 and 3 exert on each other alters the bargaining
power of agent 2 with respect to agent 1, and agent 2 obtains a larger share of the budget.
This methodology can be generalized to any number of agents. If the economy is formed by
n1 + n2 agents and only the ﬁrst n1 of them are engaged into a bargaining problem, ﬁrst we have
to compute the matrix of network externalities E(B) for the economy as a whole, i.e. considering
all the n1 + n2 agents. Then, we solve the bargaining problem using the submatrix formed by the
ﬁrst n1 rows and columns, E1 (B), as if this last matrix was the matrix of network externalities of
this (sub-)economy. In this way we internalize all the network eﬀects generated by the structural
inﬂuence pattern into the bargaining problem played by the ﬁrst n1 individuals, when considering
all agents in the economy.
The next proposition provides a characterization of the matrix E1 (B) for such a situation.
Let B11 be the matrix of bilateral inﬂuences across participants, B22 be the matrix of bilateral
inﬂuences across nonparticipants, B12 be the matrix of bilateral inﬂuences from nonparticipants to
participants, and B21 be the matrix of bilateral inﬂuences from participants to nonparticipants.
Proposition 5 If n = n1 +n2, with 1 < n1 < n being the number of members of the economy that
participate in the bargaining game, then
E1 =
 
In1 − B11 − B12   (In2 − B22)
−1 B21
 −1
This matrix has a natural interpretation. Observe that it is equivalent to the matrix of network
externalities that we would obtain if the economy had only the n1 agents that are involved in
the distributive conﬂict and the matrix of bilateral inﬂuences were B11 + B12   (In2 − B22)
−1 B21.
Matrix (In2 − B22)
−1 equals the matrix of network externalities if only nonparticipants were in
the economy, E(B22). Hence, this new associated matrix of bilateral inﬂuences across participants
25accounts on the feedback eﬀect, derived from inﬂuence exerted by participants on nonparticipants
and viceversa, of network externalities exerted within the subeconomy formed by nonparticipants.
From right to left the matrix
B12   (In2 − B22)
−1 B21
is obtained by ﬁrst taking into account the direct bilateral inﬂuences participants exert on non-
participants, then network eﬀects among non-participants are computed, and ﬁnally we compute
how these come back again to partipants through direct inﬂuence exerted by non-participants on
participants. the product of these three eﬀects is added to the initial matrix of bilateral inﬂuences
across participants to compute the solution to the Nash bargaining problem.
In our framework, if there were no inﬂuences, i.e. bij = 0 for all pairs ij, then the bargaining
power of each agent would exactly coincide with the Nash bargaining solution share he receives.
Once inﬂuences are introduced, any change in the levels of consumption of the Nash bargaining
solution shares proﬁle can be interpreted as a change in bargaining power due to the position in the
network of bilateral inﬂuences. Here, network externalities, the aggregation of direct and indirect
network eﬀects, generates the pattern of bargaining power, if we want to interpret the allocation
solution as the solution of an asymmetric bargaining problem without inﬂuences.
Kalai (1977) studies how non-participants in a Nash bargaining problem induce a change of
bargaining power across participants, interpreting each non-participant as a replica of the partic-
ipant for which this agent cares. In our case, each non-participant can care at the same time for
diﬀerent participants with varying intensities and we can provide the particular mapping from this
interdependency structure to bargaining asymmetric outcomes.
4.4 α-economies.
In this section we study a family of networks with some particular properties.
Let α ∈ R+. We say that an economy is an α-economy if whenever bij  = 0, then bij = bji = α.
Hence, in an α-economy whenever there is a bilateral inﬂuence this inﬂuence is bidirectional and
of same weight.18
In this family of economies the heterogeneity comes only from one source, the network geometry,
and not from heterogeneous inﬂuence levels across pairs of agents. Therefore the analysis of this
family of networks sheds some light on the isolated eﬀect of the network geometry on the Nash
bargaining outcome. In fact, as we show in the following lines, the characterization of the Nash
bargaining solution becomes very transparent under some mild assumptions.
Fixed α and an α-economy B, we deﬁne the degree of agent i, that we denote by degi (B), as
degi (B) =
1
α
 
j =i
bij (8)
18Observe that in the family of α-economies G = B, since matrix B is symmetric.
26The degree of an agent is a measure of connectivity. It equals the number of connections an agent
has in the network of bilateral inﬂuences. Due to the symmetric nature of α-economies, the degree
of an agent computes at the same time to how many people this agents exerts a direct inﬂuence,
and from how many people this agent receives a direct inﬂuence.
Suppose that if agents do not agree in a division of the resource the disagreement outcome is
that no division is implemented and hence agents receive a utility equal to 0, i.e. d = 0. Then,
under the regularity condition 1 − (n − 1)α > 0 that ensures that for a ﬁxed α any α-economy is
regular, we obtain the following characterization:
Proposition 6 Let B be a regular α-economy. Then the Nash bargaining solution is interior and
the utility each agent obtains is
uS
i =
1
n(1 − αdegi (B))
Hence,
cS
i =
1
n(1 − αdegi (B))
−
 
j =i
bij
1
n(1 − αdegj (B))
Hence, for α-economies the degree of an agent is the unique element relevant from the network
to determine the utility this agent obtains. Observe that the share an agent obtains does not only
depend on its own degree but also on the degrees of agents to which he is connected.
Example 5. Consider the following two networks.
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In both networks there are four agents with three neighbours and four with two neighbours.
However, if for example α = 0.1, agents with three neighbours agents with three neighbours receive
a larger share of the pie than in the second network, while the opposite applies for agents with two
links. The following table provides the shares in both cases for the members of each class.
Nash Shares with α = 0.1 Ba Bb
Agents with 3 links 0.129 0.127
Agents with 2 links 0.121 0.123
This proves that the degree distribution is not a suﬃcient invariant to determine how the resource
is distributed, it is also important the particular geometry of how agents are connected. This is
expressed in the following corollary.
27Corollary 2 The share an agent obtains in the Nash bargaining solution increases with the number
of neighbours he has and diminishes with the number of neighbours that his neighbours have.
That is why we obtain diﬀerent shares in the previous pair of networks. In the ﬁrst one each
agent that has three neighbours has one neighbour with three links and two with two links, while
in the right one each agent with three links has two neighbours with three links and one with two.
In accordance with this last corollary, this agents should obtain a smaller share in the network at
the right, that is what we have observed before.
This last corollary provides in fact the main intuition on how the Nash bargaining solution
internalizes inﬂuences. The share an agent receives depends on the aggregate level of bilateral
inﬂuences provided at the local level. The more connected an agent is and the less connected his
neighbours are, the more valuable is the share this agent receives for the spread of inﬂuence through
the network. If, instead, his neighbours are also very connected, it is not necessary to give more to
this agent. In this case other agents receive larger shares than before because they help more to
spread the eﬀect of inﬂuences all over the economy. The Nash bargaining solution with inﬂuences
internalizes this indirect eﬀects.
A particular case are degree-regular α-economies. In such economies all agents have the same
degree. Here pattern does not matter. In fact, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Let k ∈ {0,...,n − 1} and let B be a regular α-economy such that degi (B) = k for
all i ∈ N. Then all agents obtain the same utility and consume the same quantity in the Nash
bargaining solution. In particular cS
i = 1/n for all i ∈ N and
uS
i =
1
n(1 − kα)
∀i ∈ N
Therefore in the case of regular -economies it does not matter how agents are connected but
how many connections each agent has.
Example 6. The following two networks, with each link being bidirectional and with same weight
α, diﬀer in their particular geometry and lead to the same solution to the bargaining problem.
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The network depicted in the right side has larger clustering19 levels than the one in the left. This
is not an issue in the determination of the Nash bargaining solution. This example shows that
clustering plays no role in the resulting division that solves the distributional conﬂict under degree-
regularity.
19Clustering measures if the agents to which an agent is connected are also connected within them.
285 The Eﬀect of Network Changes on Welfare and Consumption
In this section we explore how changes in the network of bilateral inﬂuences20 translate into changes
in welfare and consumption patterns. In particular, we center our attention in how a diﬀerential
change on the weight of a link changes the utility and the level of consumption in equilibrium of
each agent involved in the bargaining game. Hence, our results help to understand how changes in
the magnitude of inﬂuences change the characteristics of the bargaining outcome.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus our attention in situations where the bargaining solution is
interior, meaning that cS
i > 0 and, hence, uS
i > umin
i for every i ∈ N.21
The following proposition provides conclusions on comparative statics related to the utility
pattern of the Nash bargaining solution.22
Proposition 7 Let B deﬁne an economy with inﬂuences such that the Nash bargaining solution is
interior. Then:
(i)
∂uS
i
∂bkl ≥ 0 if l  = i, with equality if and only if dl = 0
(ii) sign
 
∂uS
i
∂bki
 
= sign
 
1 −
 
j =i δjdj
 
for k  = i.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition states that the Nash bargaining solution utility of agent i
generally increases when there is an increase on the magnitude of a bilateral inﬂuence across any
two other agents, whoever these are. Increases on bilateral inﬂuences agents diﬀerent than i exert
on each other are beneﬁcial for agent i.
The second part of the proposition is a little bit more complex. It states that the increase on
bilateral inﬂuences exerted by agent i are good for agent i if the term
 
j =i δjdj is suﬃciently small
(in fact, if it is smaller than one). Observe that this can happen either because the disagreement
levels of agents diﬀerent than i are small or because the levels of the δ’s are small for agents diﬀerent
than i. Agent j has a small level of δj whenever he exerts on the aggregate large positive bilateral
inﬂuences on other agents. Hence, for agent i it is good to exert larger positive inﬂuences, if other
agents exert large aggregate levels of bilateral inﬂuences. The intuition is that larger bilateral inﬂu-
ences exerted by agent i can increase indirect network inﬂuences from i to himself (through cycles
in the network of bilateral inﬂuences) if other agents exert suﬃciently high bilateral inﬂuences as
well. If not, and for example other agents exert some bilateral negative inﬂuences, the indirect
20We make no distinction in deﬁning the model in terms of networks or in terms of utilities. We refer to network
changes because at some points this simpliﬁes the necessary terminology.
21A more extensive analysis could be done to deal with corner solutions.
22If an economy is such that the Nash bargaining solution is interior, suﬃciently small changes in the parameters
of bilateral inﬂuences maintain interiority because of continuity. Hence, a comparative statics analysis in our setup
is legitimated.
29network eﬀects can be negative for agent i and imply a decrease on utility.
We move now to comparative statics results related to consumption patterns. These are pro-
vided in the following result.
Proposition 8 Let B deﬁne an economy with inﬂuences such that the Nash bargaining solution is
interior. If d = 0,23 then:
(i)
∂cS
i
∂bki > 0 if k  = i
(ii) sign
 
∂cS
i
∂bkl
 
= −sign(bil) if k  = i  = l  = k
(iii)
∂cS
i
∂bij > 0 ⇔ bij < −δj for j  = i
The ﬁrst part of the proposition states a very simple and natural conclusion: agent i receives a
larger share whenever the level of aggregate bilateral inﬂuences he exerts increases.24 This generates
a positive eﬀect on several other agents in the economy through the spread of bilateral inﬂuences
through network eﬀects. We could also interpret this result in terms of bargaining power: since
he exerts a larger aggregate level of bilateral inﬂuences his bargaining power increases, and that is
why he gets a larger fraction of the resource.
The second part of the proposition states that if agent i receives a positive (resp. negative)
direct bilateral inﬂuence from agent l then an increase of the direct bilateral inﬂuence agent l exerts
on another agent k, diﬀerent than i and l, implies that agent’s i share diminishes (resp.increases).
This is reminiscent of the result of the ﬁrst part of the proposition, and hence the same kind of
intuition applies.
Finally, the third part expresses that an increase in the weight of the direct bilateral inﬂuence
agent l exerts on i implies an increase in agent i share if and only if the initial weight of this bilateral
externality was suﬃciently negative.
We recover example 3.(b) of section 4 to illustrate graphically how small changes on the levels of
bilateral inﬂuences translate into changes on the utility and shares derived from the Nash bargaining
solution. This example is the 2-person economy such that b12 = b21 = 1/2. If we increase b12 from
the initial b12 = 1/2 to ˜ b12 = 1/2 + ǫ, where ǫ < 1/2 to satisfy the regularity condition, the new
matrix of bilateral inﬂuences is
˜ B =
 
0 1/2 + ǫ
1/2 0
 
23We consider this case since it is the more tractable one. In the proof the interested reader can ﬁnd the exact
expression of each one of the derivatives, no matter which disagreement point we consider.
24And the rest of bilateral inﬂuences do not vary.
30and the new matrix of network externalities is
˜ E(B) =
4
3 − 2ǫ
 
1 1/2 + ǫ
1/2 1
 
The utility possibility set and the Nash bargaining solution behave as follows (dashed lines represent
the initial situation and continuous lines represent the new one; uS is the initial Nash bargaining
solution and ˜ uS is the new one)
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Figure 8
The increase on the level of altruism of agent 1 shifts the Pareto frontier upwards. Both agents
obtain a larger utility in the new equilibrium of the bargaining game. This is consistent with the
conclusions of proposition 7,25 and now the division is no more half of the budget for each one.
Indeed, the equilibrium point ˜ uS is closer to one of the extremes of the simplex than to the other.
In particular it is closer to e(2) which implies that cS
2 has increased while cS
1 has decreased. The
increase of cS
2 is consistent with part (i) in proposition 8 while the decrease of e(1) is consistent
with part (iii), since b12 = 1/2 > −1/4 = −δ2/2.
6 Discussion
Until this point we have not discussed the suitability of the Nash bargaining solution in our setup.
An initial point of debate is that with the use of this solution we abstract from the eﬀect of
coalitions when there are more than two agents. It could be possible that some agents decide to
break relations with the rest of agents in the economy, and that this threat plays a role in the ﬁnal
25Observe that the increase in u
S
1 is the conclusion of part (i) while the increase of u
S
2 is the conclusion of part
(ii), since d = 0.
31division of resources. However, we do not think that in our setup this question plays a prominent
role in the examples we have used to motivate our research.
Consider for example the example on urban crime. Except for the case in which the fear on
crime is overwhelming, and citizens view the rest of problems associated with everyday urban life
as secondary, it is diﬃcult to imagine that this dispute on resources to ﬁght against crime will lead
to the division of the city. 26
Similarly, in the social preferences example, we would not expect that members of a family would
decide to break relations when natural daily distributional conﬂicts within the family arise.27
The omission of coalitions role is more controversial in the case of government spending. If only
the simple majority of members of the government have to agree on the division of the budget, as it
is the case in the analysis provided in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), this has non-negligible strategic
implications on the ﬁnal agreement reached. It has been our aim in this work to analyze in detail
how the eﬀects of pairwise inﬂuences aﬀects distributional conﬂict. Of course, by adding to this
pairwise inﬂuences pattern more institutional details, such as the majority voting rule in the case
of government spending, we would obtain more accurate predictions of each particular example. 28
Another consideration is the harmonization of the axioms that characterize the Nash bargaining
solution and our setup with interdependent utilities. We provide here a discussion on this in terms
of the alternative set of axioms proposed by Lensberg (1988). In particular, Lensberg shows that
the Nash bargaining solution is the unique solution that satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃciency, Anonimity (if
a utility possibility set is symmetric the solution is also symmetric) 29, Scale Invariance (when
applying a linear transformation of utilities the solution changes accordingly to this linear trans-
formation), and Consistency (if a subset of agents receive the utility they would receive in the
solution, when applying the solution to the rest of the economy, the result is the same as if at the
beginning we applied the solution to the economy as whole). 30
Both Pareto Eﬃciency and Anonymity seem to be desirable properties of a bargaining solution.
In our setup Scale Invariance is also desirable because when applying a linear transformation of
utilities the preferences represented remain unperturbed.31 Therefore, the axiom of Scale Invari-
ance imposes that these equivalent utility representations lead to the same solution. Hence, if we
consider the three previous axioms as natural requirements of a solution, the unique axiom for the
26Undoubtedly, there are cities in which this problem is real, and some neighbourhoods are introducing physical
barriers to combat crime at private expenses. Is in these kind of situations in which our model would certainly not
apply.
27But maybe it can be the case when dealing with a bequest.
28See Duggan(2004) for conditions about existence of equilibria in the n agents version of the Baron and Ferejohn
game with externalities.
29More precisely, if x ∈ UPS then σ(x) ∈ UPS for any permutation σ of the entries of x.
30Nashs (1950) characterization substitutes Consistency by a probably more diﬃcult to interpret axiom named
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
31This is because utilities in our model are additively separable with respect to consumption levels.
32Nash bargaining solution that might deserve discussion is Consistency.
7 Conclusion
We have explored the outcome of the Nash bargaining problem with considering a simple model of
interdependent behavior. Even if an economy is characterized by n(n − 1) variables, the model is
tractable and we have been able to provide closed-form expressions for the bargaining outcome and
comparative statics results. The network interpretation of the problem is helpful since it provides
us with a set of tools that simplify the analysis and makes it more intuitive. It helps to understand
the eﬀect of heterogeneities in the model in all its dimensions, magnitude and pattern.
Part of the analysis in our work shows some similarities with previous work done by Kalai
(1977).32 Kalai interprets any agent that cares for a player in the bargaining problem but that
do not participate in the bargaining problem, as a replica of this player. In our model, an agent
can care for diﬀerent players of the game, where this concern translates into inﬂuences as in the
social preferences example in the introduction. The transmission of this concern is not done as
a replication and its consequent change into the bargaining problem but through a pattern of
diﬀerent inﬂuences that aﬀect players’ behavior. In this sense, we allow for a more general pattern
of interrelations and the transition is not done in a discrete manner, as replicas would do, but
smoothly, since small changes in bilateral externality levels imply small changes in the levels of
network eﬀects.
Finally, our analysis borrows directly from the Nash bargaining solution. Diﬀerent possible
directions for further research are open. One possible direction could be to explore whether other
cooperative solutions can be deﬁned through some proper axioms adequate in a setting with het-
erogeneous inﬂuences such as the one developed in this work. Another possible direction is to go
further in the study of non-cooperative bargaining models with an underlying structural pattern of
bilateral inﬂuences. In particular, it might be valuable to study how the pattern of inﬂuences maps
into equilibria of non-cooperative bargaining games that incorporate relevant features of particular
applications, such as the voting rule in legislative bargaining, and how equilibria vary with respect
to the case without inﬂuences.
32See also Lensberg and Thomson (1989) for some other work done with replicated agents in cooperative bargaining.
338 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The determinant of the matrix I − B is a polynomial in n(n − 1) variables. The set of points of
Rn(n−1) in which this polynomial vanishes forms an algebraic variety of dimension n(n − 1) − 1 at
most, and hence it is a set with Lebesgue measure equal to zero in Rn(n−1).
Proof of Proposition 2
The following lemma is useful.
Lemma 2 Given a regular economy B, a feasible allocation c is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if there
exists a strict system of weights µ such that µ   u(c) ≥ µ   ¯ u for every ¯ U ∈ UPS(B).
Proof of Lemma 2 This is a slight variation of a well-known result relating Pareto eﬃciency
to linear social welfare functions (see for example Proposition 16.E.2, pg.560, in Mas-Colell et al.,
1995). The statement in terms of strict system of weights is valid because the shape of UPS(B) is
a simplex, not simply a convex set. ￿
Since there is no possibility of confusion we omit the dependence of E on B. Observe that for
any allocation c, the vector of utilities is u(c) =
 n
i=1 ciei. If there exists a strict system of weights
µ and a strictly positive constant κ such that µ   ei = κ we have that for any allocation c
µ   u(c) =
n  
i=1
ci
 
µ   e(i)
 
= κ
n  
i=1
ci
Since κ > 0, we have that µ   u(c) is maximal whenever
 n
i=1 ci = 1. Hence, any allocation such
that
 n
i=1 ci = 1 is Pareto eﬃcient and the economy is regular.
Now, suppose any allocation such that
 n
i=1 ci = 1 is Pareto eﬃcient. Consider an interior
allocation, i.e. such that ci > 0 for every i ∈ N. The unique possible strict system of weights that
can separate u(c) to the utility possibility set in the form of lemma 2 is the strict system of weights
orthonormal to the hyperplane that contains the n columns of the matrix of network externalities.
Obviously, this system of weights also separates u(c) to the utility possibility set when ci = 0 for
some i ∈ N. Hence, we have the unique candidate for the strict system of weights in the statement
of proposition 2. From lemma 2 we know that in particular µ u(c) ≥ µ u(0) = 0. We can ensure
that in fact this last inequality is strict since if it were equal to zero we would not be in a generic
situation.33￿
33If it were equal to zero this would imply that the columns of the matrix of network externalities are linearly
dependent, and hence that the determinant of E is equal to zero. This would mean that we were considering a non
solvable system of bilateral inﬂuences.
34Proof of Proposition 3
From proposition 2 we know that there exists an strict system of weights µ and a strictly positive
constant such that µ   e(i) = κ for every i ∈ N. In matrix terms this is equal to
ET (B)   µ = κ1
where ET (B) is the transpose matrix of E(B) and 1 is the n-dimensional vector with all entries
equal to 1. Hence, we have that, since the inverse matrix of ET (B) is equal to (I − B)
T,
µ = κ
 
(I − B)
T   1
 
Therefore,  i = κ
 
1 −
 
j =i bji
 
. Since µ is an strict system of weights, we have that
κ
n  
i=1

1 −
 
j =i
bji

 = 1
and hence
κ =
1
 n
i=1
 
1 −
 
j =i bji
 
Let δi = 1 −
 
j =i bji, and let δ =
 n
i=1 δi. Then
 i =
δi
δ
Since µ is an strict system of weights, all entries of µ have to be strictly positive, and this can only
happen if either all δi’s are strictly positive or all δi’s are strictly negative. However, in the latter
case κ would be negative, since κ = 1/(δ). Hence to obtain a regular economy it is necessary that
δi = 1 −
 
j =i bji > 0 for every i ∈ N.
The suﬃciency result is almost immediate. Consider the weights and κ deﬁned in Lemma 1 in the
text. Then by construction these coeﬃcients satisfy the regularity condition in proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let µ and κ be the strict system of weights and constant from Proposition 2 associated to the
economy. Let J ⊆ N be the set of agents for which dj ≥ umin
j . The Nash bargaining problem with
network externalities is equal to
max
u∈UPS(B)
n  
i=1
ln(ui − di)
subject to
n  
i=1
 iui = κ (9)
35ui ≥ di if i ∈ J (10)
ui ≥ umin
i if i / ∈ J (11)
We know that the solution to this problem is unique. We denote this solution us. Let ¯ ψ be the
multiplier associated to restriction (9). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the problem are
1
uS
i − di
≤ ¯ ψ i with equality if uS
i > di (i ∈ J) (12)
1
uS
i − di
≤ ¯ ψ i with equality if uS
i > umin
i (i / ∈ J) (13)
From (12) we obtain that for each i ∈ J we must have 1
uS
i −di = ψ i. If not, the value of the
objective function in the solution would be −∞. Hence, if, for simplicity, we denote ψ = 1/ ¯ ψ, we
have
uS
i = di + ψ
1
 i
for every i ∈ J
On the other hand, we obtain from (13) that, for every i / ∈ J, uS
i must satisfy
uS
i = max
 
umin
i ,di + ψ
1
 i
 
for every i / ∈ J
Observe in particular that, for every i / ∈ J it holds that uS
i = umin
i if and only if  i
 
umin
i − di
 
≥ ψ.
Using this fact, we proceed to provide and algorithm that at most in n steps provides the solution
to the problem. As we stated in text, we suppose without loss of generality that  1
 
umin
1 − d1
 
≥
    ≥  n
 
umin
n − dn
 
Step 0:
Suppose uS
i = di+ψ(0) 1
µi for every i ∈ N. The multiplier ψ(0) is equal to ψ(0) = 1
n
  n
i=1  i
 
uS
i − di
  
=
1
n (κ − µ   d). If  1
 
umin
1 − d1
 
< ψ(0), then ψ = ψ(0) and uS is the utility vector associated to the
Nash bargaining solution, and we are done. If not, go to step 1.
Step 1:
Suppose uS
1 = umin
1 and uS
i = di + ψ(1) 1
µi for every i > 1. The multiplier ψ(1) is equal to
ψ(1) = 1
n−1
  n
i=2  i
 
uS
i − di
  
= 1
n−1
 
κ − µd −  1
 
uS
1 − d1
  
. Observe that
(n − 1)ψ(1) = κ − µd −  1
 
uS
1 − d1
 
≤ nψ(0) − ψ(0)
Hence, ψ(1) ≤ ψ(0), and therefore we know for sure that  1
 
umin
1 − d1
 
≥ ψ(1). If  2
 
umin
2 − d2
 
<
ψ(1), then ψ = ψ(1) and uS is the utility vector associated to the Nash bargaining solution, and we
are done. If not, go to step 2.
Step k (2 ≤ k < n):
36Suppose uS
i = umin
i for i ≤ k and uS
i = di + ψ(k) 1
µi for i > k. An analogous reasoning to the
one in the previous step establishes that ψ(k) ≤ ψ(k−1). In fact
(n − k)ψ(k) = κ − µ   d −
k  
l=1
 l
 
uS
l − dl
 
≤ (n − k + 1)ψ(k−1) − ψ(k−1) = (n − k)ψ(k−1)
The last inequality follows from the previous step of the procedure. If  k+1
 
umin
k+1 − dk+1
 
< ψ(k),
uS is the utility vector associated to the Nash bargaining solution, and we are done.
This process ﬁnishes at most in step n − 1 since in this case we get that
ψ(n−1) = κ − µd −
n−1  
i=1
 i
 
umin
i − di
 
>  n
 
umin
n − dn
 
This last inequality follows from the fact that κ = µ   uS > µ   umin, since umin can not be the
total vector of utilities associated to an eﬃcient allocation. Thus, if we arrive to step n−1, we can
ensure that the utility vector associated to the Nash bargaining solution is uS
i = umin
i for i < n
and uS
n = dn + ψ(n−1) 1
µn > umin
n .
Proof of Proposition 5
The matrix of bilateral inﬂuences is
B =
 
B11 B12
B21 B22
 
The matrix of network externalities of the whole economy is E(B) = (I − B)
−1 and we can de-
compose it as follows:
E(B) = (In − B)
−1 =
 
E1 E12
E21 E2
 
=
 
In1 − B11 B12
B21 In2 − B22
 −1
To avoid misunderstandings, we omit the dependence on B for E1,E2,E12 and E21. In particular,
the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
E1   (In1 − B11) + E12   B21 = In1 (14)
E1   B12 + E12   (In2 − B22) = 0n1 (15)
From the second condition, we obtain that
E12 = −E1   B12   (In2 − B22)
−1
37Plugging this back into the ﬁrst condition we obtain that
E1  
 
In1 − B11 − B12   (In2 − B22)
−1 B21
 
= In1
And the result follows.
Proof of proposition 6
Fix α. The network in which the minimal utility of an agent is maximal is the complete net-
work, where all pair of agents are connected. The matrix E for the complete network has entries
1−(n−2)α
(1+α)(1−(n−1)α) in the diagonal and α
(1+α)(1−(n−1)α) outside the diagonal. The minimal utility an
agent can obtain is the minimum of this two numbers, which coincides with the coeﬃcient outside
the diagonal, given the regularity assumption 1 − (n − 1)α > 0. Hence for any α-economy B we
have that
umin
i (B) ≤
α
(1 + α)(1 − (n − 1)α)
(16)
If d = 0 we have that the condition to stop in the ﬁrst step of the algorithm provided in the proof
of Proposition 4 is
(1 − degi (B)α)umin
i (B) ≤
1
n
(17)
Given the regularity condition we know that α/(1 + α) < 1/n and therefore
α
(1 + α)(1 − (n − 1)α)
<
1
n(1 − degi (g)α)
(18)
Hence the condition in the ﬁrst step of the algorithm provided in the proof of Proposition 4 is
satisﬁed, and we are done.
Proof of Proposition 7
We can rewrite the total utility an agent obtain in an interior solution as
us
i = di +
1
nδi

1 −
n  
j=1
δjdj

 (19)
If i  = j  = k, straightforward calculus yields to
∂us
i
∂bkj
=
dj
nδi
(20)
and the result of the ﬁrst part of the proposition follows, since in any regular economy δi > 0 for
all i ∈ N.
If i  = j we have that
∂us
i
∂bji
=
1
nδ2
i

1 −
 
k =i
δkdk

 (21)
38Again, by the regularity condition, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 8
When d = 0 the share agent i obtains in the Nash bargaining solution when it is interior is
cs
i =
1
nδi
−
 
j =i
bij
1
nδj
(22)
Let k  = i. If we diﬀerentiate the expression in (22) with respect to bki we obtain
∂cs
i
∂bki
=
1
nδ2
i
> 0
and the ﬁrst part of the proposition follows.
If i,j and k are pairwise diﬀerent we have that
∂cs
i
∂bkj
= −
bij
nδ2
j
Hence,
∂cs
i
∂bkjbij ≤ 0 with equality if and only if bij = 0.
Finally, if i  = j we have that
∂cs
i
∂bij
= −
1
n
 
1
δj
+ bij
1
δ2
j
 
Hence,
∂cs
i
∂bij
> 0 ⇔ δj < −bij
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